Carrot and stick: How reemployment bonuses and benefit sanctions affect job finding rates by Klaauw, B. van der & Ours, J.C. van
TI 2010-064/3 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
Carrot and Stick:  
How Reemployment Bonuses and 
Benefit Sanctions affect Job Finding 
Rates 
 Bas van der Klaauw1 
Jan C. van Ours2 
 
1 VU University Amsterdam, and Tinbergen Institute; 
2 CentER, Tilburg University, University of Melbourne, Australia, CESifo, CEPR, and IZA. 
 
 
 
 
Tinbergen Institute 
 
The Tinbergen Institute is the institute for economic 
research of the Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 
Universiteit van Amsterdam, and Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam. 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 31 
1018 WB Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.:  +31(0)20 551 3500 
Fax: +31(0)20 551 3555 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA  Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
 
 
Most TI discussion papers can be downloaded at 
http://www.tinbergen.nl. 
Carrot and Stick: How Reemployment Bonuses and
Benefit Sanctions Affect Job Finding Rates
Bas van der Klaauw ∗
Jan C. van Ours †
July 7, 2010
Abstract
To increase their transition from welfare to work, benefit recipients in the municipality of
Rotterdam were exposed to various financial incentives, including both carrots to sticks.
Once their benefit spell exceeded one year, welfare recipients were entitled to a reemploy-
ment bonus if they found a job that lasted at least six months. However, they could also
be punished for noncompliance with eligibility requirements and face a sanction, i.e. a
temporary reducing of their benefits. In this paper we investigate how benefit sanctions
and reemployment bonuses affect job finding rates of welfare recipients. We find that ben-
efit sanctions were effective in bringing unemployed from welfare to work more quickly
while reemployment bonuses were not.
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1 Introduction
With the emerging financial crisis and rising unemployment governments consider various
policy instruments to bring unemployed back to work. This is not easy. Traditional ac-
tive labor market policies (ALMP) are often not very successful. In their overview study
of 53 evaluation studies Kluve and Schmidt (2002) conclude that both direct job creation
and employment subsidies in the public sector almost always seem to fail. Kluve (2010) fol-
lows up on this and presents an analysis of 137 ALMP evaluation studies in Europe, most
of them operating after 1990. He finds that the effectiveness of programs is quite indepen-
dent of contextual factors such as labor market institutions and macroeconomic environment.
Traditional training programs appear to have at most a modest effect on transitions from
unemployment to work. Direct employment programs in the public sector are rarely effective
and frequently detrimental for the employment prospects of participants. Card et al. (2009)
present an assessment of ALMP based on approximately 200 European and U.S. microecono-
metrics evaluations. The authors find that subsidized public sector employment programs
are relatively ineffective. Job search assistance programs have a favorable impact especially
in the short run while classroom and on-the-job training programs are not favorable in the
short-run, but have more positive impacts after two years. The bottom line of these overview
studies is that simple non-expensive programs with clear incentives for unemployed workers
work best. This is not a new finding. On the basis of outcomes from four U.S. cash bonus
experiments and six job search experiments Meyer (1995) concludes that economic incentives
affect the speed by which unemployed workers leave the unemployment insurance rolls. Some
of these job search experiments included enforcement of job search rules and administrative
measures of enforcement such as denials of benefits.
In our paper we investigate how positive and negative financial incentives affect the outflow
from welfare to work. The municipality of Rotterdam exposed welfare recipients to financial
carrots as well as financial sticks, i.e. the incentives could have positive or negative effects
on the income of benefit recipients. Benefits could be reduced temporarily as punishment for
noncompliance with eligibility requirements. However, once their benefit spell exceeded one
year, the welfare recipients were entitled to a bonus if they found a job that lasted at least
six months.1
1In the Netherlands municipalities are responsible for providing welfare benefits. Comparing the way
municipalities operate De Koning et al. (2006) find that to stimulate welfare recipients to find a job quickly
Rotterdam uses benefit sanctions and reemployment bonuses more often than other municipalities.
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We use hazard rate models to identify the effects of both financial stimuli. Identification
of the effect of benefit sanctions is based on the idea that welfare recipients cannot anticipate
the exact moment of getting punished. We follow Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) and
use of multivariate mixed proportional hazard models in which the potential selectivity in
the use of benefit sanctions is accounted for by simultaneous modeling of the sanction rate
and the job finding rate. Identification of the effect of reemployment bonuses is based on
the variations in the bonus policy that occurred during our period of analysis. Since only a
subsample of the welfare recipients are exposed to the bonus policy, there is a well-defined
control group to separate calendar-time effects from the effects of the reemployment bonuses.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we analyze the effect of reemployment
bonuses in a recent non-U.S., non-experimental setting. So far, knowledge about the effect of
reemployment bonuses is limited to a few 1980s pilot studies in the U.S. where benefits are
relatively low and short-lasting. We analyze the effect of reemployment bonuses in recent years
in the context of European style labor market institutions with relatively high benefits and
long benefit durations. Second, we analyze financial incentives in a setting where unemployed
workers are exposed to both positive and negative stimuli. As far as we know there are no
other empirical studies who analyze the simultaneous effects of positive and negative financial
incentives. We find that benefit sanctions are very effective while reemployment bonuses are
not.
The setup of our paper is as follows. In section 2 we give an overview of previous studies on
benefit sanctions and reemployment bonuses. Section 3 discusses financial incentives to which
welfare recipients are exposed in Rotterdam. This section also provides a description of our
data. In section 4 we present our statistical model, and in section 5 we discuss our estimation
results from which we conclude that benefit sanctions speed up the transition from welfare to
work while reemployment bonuses have no effect. In section 6 we provide an explanation of
our main findings. Section 7 concludes.
2 Previous studies
2.1 Benefit sanctions
There are a couple of empirical studies that investigate the effects of benefit sanctions on
job finding rates. Abbring et al. (2005) analyze how benefit sanctions in the Netherlands
affected the job finding rates of unemployment benefits recipients. According to the Dutch
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Unemployment Insurance law there are three categories of infringements for which workers can
have benefit sanctions imposed: lack of effort to find a job (search intensity too low, declining
job offers), administrative infringements (reporting too late), and other infringements (fraud,
inaccurate information). The sanction is a temporary or a permanent full or partial reduction
of the benefit level. In practice, the temporary partial reduction of the benefits ranged from 5%
during four weeks to 25 or 30% during 13 weeks. Abbring et al. find that reemployment rates
are significantly and substantially raised by imposition of a benefit sanction. The increase
in reemployment rate varies from 35 to 100% depending on industry and gender, where
the effects for women are substantially larger than for men. Van den Berg et al. (2004)
analyses the effects of sanctions on the behavior of welfare (benefits) recipients in Rotterdam.
A welfare recipient has similar obligations as a unemployment benefit recipient in order to
remain eligible for a benefit. The duration and size of the reduction depend on the nature
of the infringement ranging from 5% during one month to 20% during four months. It turns
out that when a benefit sanction is imposed the job finding rate more than doubles. The
benefit sanction itself is temporary, but its effects turn out to be long lasting. Even after
the sanction period expires the transition rate from welfare to work is higher than before
the sanction was imposed. From an analysis of Swiss data on benefit sanctions Lalive et
al. (2005) conclude that by imposing a benefit sanction the job finding rate to go up with
45% causing the unemployment duration to decrease with roughly three weeks from 33 to
30 weeks. Jensen et al. (2003) find a small effect of the sanctions that are part of Danish
youth unemployment program. However, also using Danish data Svarer (2007) finds that
the unemployment exit rate increases by more than 50% following enforcement of a sanction.
Boockmann et al. (2009) investigate the effectiveness of benefit sanctions applied to welfare
recipients in Germany. They use variation in sanction strategies and sanction rates across
welfare agencies in an instrumental variable framework to account for potential selectivity in
the use of benefit sanctions. They find that a sanction increases the probability of the welfare
system within eight months after the benefit cut by about 70% points.
So, from previous studies it is clear that benefit sanctions speed up job finding, i.e. they
have a positive “treatment” effect. The size of the penalty or the duration of the punishment
doesn’t seem to be important (Van den Berg et al., 2004). It could be monitoring that
is driving the treatment effect rather than the sanction per se. Indeed, McVicar (2008)
investigates the effect of monitoring on the duration of unemployment by exploiting periods
of monitoring suspension during Benefit Office refurbishments in part of the UK. He finds that
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suspension of monitoring led to significantly lower exit rates from unemployment. Studies
that distinguish between warnings and actual enforcement of benefit sanctions show that both
matter (Lalive et al., 2005, and Arni et al., 2009).
Although most previous studies find positive treatment effects of benefit sanctions, these
seem to come at a cost. As far as we know there are only two studies that investigate the
effect of benefit sanctions on the quality of the post-unemployment job. Arni et al. (2009)
evaluate the effects of benefit sanctions on post-unemployment employment stability, on exits
from the labor market and on earnings. They find that both warnings and enforcement
increase the job finding rate and the exit rate out of the labor force. Warnings do not affect
subsequent employment stability but do reduce post-unemployment earnings. Actual benefit
reductions lower the quality of post-unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well
as in terms of earnings. For unemployed workers the net effect of a benefit sanction on post-
unemployment income is negative. Over a period of two years after leaving unemployment
workers who got a benefit sanction imposed face an income loss equivalent to 30 days. Van
den Berg and Vikstro¨m (2009) also study the post-unemployment effects of benefit sanctions.
Using Swedish data they find that sanctions lower wages and hours of work and lead to a
lower occupational level of post-unemployment jobs.
2.2 Reemployment bonuses
Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) present an analysis of the first reemployment bonus ex-
periments, conducted in Illinois, from mid-1984 to mid-1985. In this experiment a random
sample of new UI (Unemployment Insurance) claimants were informed that they would qual-
ify for a cash bonus of $500 if they found of job of 30 hours or more per week within 11 weeks
of filing the claim, and would hold that job for four months. In the second experiment a
second random sample of new UI claimants was told that their next employer would qualify
for a cash bonus if the claimants would find a job within 11 weeks and if they retained their
job for four months. The authors find that the reemployment bonus in the first experiment
reduced unemployment duration with approximately one week. The second experiment had
a much smaller effect. The post-unemployment earnings of members of the treatment group
didn’t differ from the earnings of members of the control group. Another interesting finding
concerns the take-up rate, i.e. the percentage of workers who qualified for the bonus and
actually took the steps to claim it. The take-up rate in the first experiment was 54%, while
in the second experiment the take-up rate was as low as 12%. Anderson (1992) presents
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an analysis of a New Jersey reemployment bonus experiment, conducted from mid-1986 to
mid 1987. In this experiment UI claimants were randomly assigned to one of three treat-
ment groups or a control group. All UI claimants in the treatment groups were assigned to
job-search assistance activities. One group was offered a cash bonus for finding a new job,
with the bonus declining over the unemployment spell falling to zero in the eleventh week of
unemployment after the initial offer. A second group was offered assistance in getting into
a job-training program while a third group was offered nothing. The author finds that the
effect of a bonus on the job finding rate is significantly positive early in the offer period,
when the bonus was largest. Decker (1994) compares the Illinois and New Jersey experi-
ments focusing on the duration dependence of the reemployment bonus, which was constant
in Illinois but declining in New Jersey. The author finds that the declining bonus offer in
New Jersey affected relative short-term unemployed relative more while the constant bonus
offer in Illinois had a substantial impact on longer-term unemployed. Decker and O’Leary
(1995) analyze the results from reemployment bonus experiments conducted in 1988 and 1989
in Pennsylvania and Washington, which differed in the amount of the bonus offer and the
period for which an individual qualified for the bonus. The Pennsylvania experiment tested
four different bonus offers based on two alternative bonus amounts and two alternative qual-
ification periods. The Washington experiment compared six different bonus offers based on
three alternative bonus amounts and two alternative qualification periods. The authors find
that more generous bonus offers generated larger impacts than did less generous offers but
the overall effects are relatively modest. Both experiments reduced UI receipt by an average
of about a week, while the impact on the post-unemployment earning was not statistically
significant. O’Leary, Spiegelman and Kline (1995) also present an analysis of the Washington
reemployment bonus experiment. They find that the strongest treatment response was ex-
hibited by claimants who were offered a high bonus level with a long qualification period. For
this treatment unemployment duration went down with 0.76 weeks. The results from the four
U.S. reemployment bonus experiments have been reinvestigated a number of times. Meyer
(1996) reexamines the results from the part of the Illinois reemployment bonus experiment in
which the bonus was paid to UI recipients and focusing on the suitability of a reemployment
bonus program for permanent adoption. According to Meyer, in a permanent program a
larger fraction of workers that qualify for a bonus might complete the paperwork necessary to
receive it. Furthermore, a permanent bonus program might encourage unemployed workers to
file for UI. O’Leary, Decker and Wandner (2005) reexamine the Pennsylvania and Washing-
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ton experiments to investigate whether bonuses targeted to those most likely to exhaust UI
benefits would be cost-effective. They find some evidence that targeting may be beneficial.2
All in all, there is a variety of outcomes of the reemployment bonus experiments depending
on the details of the experiment but overall they seem to have had a positive but small effect
on the job finding rates.
An interesting finding on the use of reemployment bonuses is the low take-up rate. As
indicated before, in the Illinois experiment only 54% of the unemployed workers entitled to
the bonus actually used it. Bijwaard and Ridder (2005) report that in the Illinois experiment
of the eligible workers 15% refused participation, while of the eligible employers 35% refused
participation. They find noncompliance to be selective. When this selectivity is taken into
account the effects of the reemployment bonus are bigger.
Positive financial incentives seem to work. This is also the case when in stead of reemploy-
ment bonuses a temporary subsidy on earnings is provided to low income workers through
in-work benefits. An example of this is the Canadian Self Sufficiency Project (SSP) which
was introduced in the early 1990s and was intended to help welfare recipients to make a per-
manent break from welfare dependency. The subsidy scheme applied only to individuals who
accepted full-time jobs, could last for up to three years, and once workers were offered the
scheme they had to begin to work within a year. The SSP was evaluated using a randomized
design. One-half of the long-term welfare recipients was offered the SSP while the other half
remained in the regular welfare system. Data were collected for six years in order to measure
both the short-term and the long-term effects of the subsidy scheme. Card and Hyslop (2005)
show that indeed even for long-term welfare recipients earnings subsidies have a positive effect
on employment rates. However, this is not a permanent effect.
Summarizing the literature on benefit sanctions and reemployment bonuses it is clear that
financial incentives, irrespective whether they are positive or negative, increase job finding
rates. The effect of benefit sanctions seems to be larger than the effect of reemployment
bonuses.
2Bilias (2000) also reexamines the Pennsylvania reemployment bonus experiment but he focusses on the
optimal duration of the experiment, i.e. the minimal time needed to draw sensible conclusions from the
experiment and not on the outcomes of the experiment. He finds that conclusions about the effectiveness of the
experiment could have been obtained much earlier than the end of the study as designed by the experimenters.
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3 Financial incentives for welfare recipients in Rotterdam
In the Netherlands, welfare benefits are a safety-net and provide support to unemployed work-
ers who are not entitled to any other social insurance benefits like unemployment insurance
or disability insurance benefits. Thus, welfare benefits recipients are often long-term unem-
ployed with poor labor market prospects. Welfare benefits are means tested and related to the
family situation, but not limited in duration. Benefit replacement rates are usually somewhat
higher than in most other European countries and much higher than in the US (see for more
details Van den Berg et al., 2004). Welfare recipient have an obligation to actively search for
a job.
3.1 Reemployment bonuses
Under some conditions, welfare recipients in Rotterdam were entitled to reemployment bonuses.
Such bonuses exist in Rotterdam since 1997. Over the period of our analysis 2000–2003 the
main condition was that the individuals had to be on welfare benefits for at least one year.
Furthermore, at the start of the job they had to be off benefits and the workers had to remain
employed for at least six months. Even though the calendar period we consider is rather
short, the reemployment bonus rules changed frequently. Since our inflow sample starts on
the first day of January 2000, the rules related to accepting regular jobs in the years 2001,
2002 and 2003 are important.3 These rules were the following. In 2001 workers were entitled
to a maximum of 1800 Euros, to be paid in four equal amounts of 450 Euros, each six months
after the start of the job provided the worker remained employed.4 In 2002 workers were
entitled to a reemployment tax rebate of maximum 2269 Euros over a period of three years;
1361 in the first year and 454 in the second and third year. In 2003 no reemployment bonuses
were paid for employment that started after January 1, 2003.
From the perspective of the welfare recipients these change in rules implies the following.
Workers starting to receive welfare benefits in 2000 who found a job after at least 12 months
of unemployment were entitled to a reemployment bonus of maximum 1800 Euros when that
job was found in the calendar year 2001. This is a non-trivial amount equal to 1.6 times the
3These rules are national rules applying to acceptance of regular jobs. In addition to these national rules
there were also municipality rules which applied to the acceptance of subsidized jobs. The entitlement regula-
tions were the same for subsidized jobs but the amounts involved were substantially smaller.
4In 2001 welfare benefits were 1015 Euros per month for married or cohabiting couples and 508 Euros for
singles. The minimum wage in 2001 was 1155 Euro, implying that for married or cohabiting welfare recipients
the replacement rate for a minimum wage job was 91%.
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monthly minimum wage. If these workers found a job in 2002 they were entitled to a tax rebate
of maximum 2269 Euros. If they found a job in 2003 they were not entitled to a reemployment
bonus. Workers starting to receive welfare benefits in 2001 who were unemployed for at least
12 months and found a job in 2002 were entitled to a tax rebate of maximum 2269 Euros. If
they found a job in 2003 they were not entitled to a reemployment bonus. Finally, workers
starting to receive welfare benefits in 2002 or 2003 were not entitled to a reemployment bonus.
The changes in the entitlement rules across inflow cohorts and within cohorts over calendar
time allows us to identify whether or not the reemployment bonuses affected the job finding
rates.
There is a fundamental difference between the U.S. experiments and the setup of the
Rotterdam bonus system. Whereas in the U.S. experiments a bonus was paid to workers
who found a job quickly, in Rotterdam welfare recipients became entitled for a reemployment
bonus after being unemployed for at least one year. The main reason for this was fear of dead
weight loss, i.e. workers taking up bonuses who would have found a job anyway. This set-up
creates disincentives for workers who are close to being unemployed for one year: why accept
a job shortly before becoming entitled to a reemployment bonus? In our empirical analysis
we investigate whether such an anticipation effect exists. In our analysis there are three issues
we have to deal with. First, there is a potential “anticipation” effect: welfare recipients who
were close to being unemployed for a year – and thus not yet entitled to a bonus – may
have postponed starting on the job until they were unemployed for more than a year and
would be entitled to a bonus. Second, people who were entitled may not have applied for
a bonus. Third, if a job was lost within six months individuals who thought at the start of
their job that they might be entitled to a bonus were not entitled after all. This means that
job search behavior by welfare recipients may have been driven more by entitlement than by
actual receipt of the bonus. Therefore, and because of data limitations discussed below, we
analyze the effect of being entitled to a bonus. In our analysis we identify the potential effect
of a reemployment bonus by comparing the pattern of duration dependence of workers who
were entitled to a reemployment bonus with the pattern of those who were not entitled. We
distinguish between an “anticipation” effect in month 12 and a “treatment” effect beyond
month 12.
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3.2 Benefit sanctions
The main reason to impose benefit sanctions is noncompliance with job search guidelines.
Other reasons are because of administrative infringements like returning late from holiday,
filling in forms incorrectly, etc. The procedure of imposing a sanction consists of two steps. In
the first step, it is established that a welfare recipient does not comply with the guidelines of
the welfare agency. Information on possible offenses can come from the monthly form a welfare
recipient has to fill in, or from conversations between the employees of the welfare agency and
the welfare recipient. It is also possible that the public employment office informs the welfare
agency about a lack of job search activity. In the second step of the sanction procedure, it is
decided whether or not the noncompliance will be punished. Noncompliance does not always
lead to a sanction.5 Local or district governments are responsible for the payment of welfare
benefits, but the national government has set binding rules and procedures concerning the
imposition of sanctions. However, these rules do not imply that the sanctions are imposed
automatically or fully objectively. The case workers of the welfare agency have some discretion
to interpret the rules. According to the procedures, the decision to impose a sanction on a
particular welfare recipient is taken by the local welfare employee after consulting a so called
“decision maker”. The decision maker checks the proposal to make sure that all the right
legal steps in the procedure have been taken. The employee of the welfare agency takes the
state of the local labor market into account when deciding whether or not a sanction should
be imposed. Furthermore, conditional on noncompliance with the guidelines, the decision
to impose a sanction also depends on characteristics of the welfare recipients like attitude,
appearance and motivation. These are all characteristics that are unobserved by the researcher
trying to investigate the effect of sanctions.
The period between the establishment of noncompliance by the case worker of the welfare
agency and the imposition of a sanction is usually one to two months. Many sanctions
are treated in an administrative way for example when welfare recipients do not provide
information about their search efforts. The municipality has the possibility of sending a
written warning to a welfare recipient, especially for failing to meet administrative obligations.
3.3 Data
Our data contain 28,039 individuals between 16 and 60 year old who started collecting welfare
benefits in Rotterdam between January 1, 2000 and August 1, 2003. In total, the data
5However, in case of severe fraud, the welfare agency may decide to pursue legal prosecution.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Men Women
Number of individuals 15,350 12,689
Number of spells 17,055 13,472
Outflow to work 49.2% 40.4%
Spells with sanction 12.5% 7.7%
Spells with warningsa) 1.7% 1.3%
Age (in years) 32.5 31.0
Children 14.1% 56.5%
Non-Dutch 15.0% 9.9%
Married 13.1% 4.7%
Reason inflow:
Leaving school 6.6% 10.3%
End work 16.5% 11.6%
End UI benefits 14.0% 8.4%
Other reasons 62.8% 69.7%
a) On warnings only information after July 2002 is available; the percentages refer to spells which originated after July
2002. The sanction rate for these spells is 7.5% and 5.1% for men and women, respectively.
include 30,527 welfare spells. There are thus some individuals with multiple spells, but the
vast majority of the individuals only experienced a single period of receiving welfare benefits
within the observation period, which ends September 1, 2003. For each individual we observe
the day of inflow and the reason of inflow into welfare. For individuals leaving welfare before
the end of the observation period, we observe the day of leaving welfare and the reason
for leaving welfare. If a sanction is given during the welfare period, we observe the exact
day at which a sanction is imposed. We do not have information about the job the welfare
recipients finds after leaving welfare. Therefore we cannot analyze how benefit sanctions and
reemployment bonuses affect the quality of the post-unemployment job.6
About 44% of the observed welfare spells describe women. Women leave welfare less often
than men because of finding work. Table 1 show that about 40% of the welfare spells of women
are observed to exit into work, while this is the case for around 49% for men. In Figure 1
we show the empirical survivor functions for men and women. In the figures we stratify by
year of starting collecting welfare benefits. There are two striking features. First, women are
more likely stay in welfare for a longer period. And second, the exit rate to work is lower
for the cohort entering welfare in 2002 compared to 2000 and 2001. The latter is probably
6In the data we observe some individuals experiencing multiple welfare spells, which would potentially allow
us to analyze time-out-of-welfare as an indicator of the quality of the job. However, in practice the number of
individuals with multiple spells is too low to perform such an analysis. As we describe in more detail below,
the availability of multiple spells does help us in the identification of our empirical model.
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the consequence of business cycle effects. Figure 2 shows that our observation period was
characterized by a (nationwide) slow-down of GDP growth in 2000 and 2001, and no growth
in 2002 and 2003. Furthermore, in Rotterdam the number of vacancies over the number of
non-employed job seekers decreased.
Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier estimate for men (left) and women (right) for different inflow cohorts.
Figure 2: Business cycle indicators.
Table 1 shows that even though men, on average, have shorter welfare spells than women,
they are more likely to be punished with a sanction. Male and female welfare recipients also
differ substantially in individual characteristics. The age profile is similar, but women are
much more likely to have children and are less likely to be married. Indeed, a substantial
share of the women are single mothers. Also the reason for entering welfare differs somewhat,
although for both men and women the “other” category is the largest. This category includes,
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for example, people entering after a divorce, after receiving an asylum, after losing their
disability benefits or stopping to work as self-employed. Men are, however, more likely to
enter welfare after some period of work (either directly or via UI).
Our data also include some information on actual payments of reemployment bonuses.
Recall that until 2001 there were only reemployment bonuses, which were specific to Rot-
terdam. At the end of 2001 also nationwide reemployment bonuses were introduced, which
partly replaced the reemployment bonuses specific to Rotterdam. And in 2002 the bonuses
were replaced with a tax rebate. Our data contain two files, one with the days of payment
of the bonuses specific to Rotterdam and one with the days of payments of the nationwide
bonuses. The data contain only an indicator to which individual the bonus was paid, but not
to which spell the bonus was tight.
Recall that individuals had to apply for receiving the bonus. We tried to match the
bonuses to specific spells and also determined eligibility for a bonus (based on minimum one
year of collecting welfare, exit to work and not returning to welfare within six months). Since
we do not have any information about tax records we can not observe which individuals
requested the tax rebate. Therefore, we focus on the bonuses in the year 2001 in which there
were mainly bonuses provided by Rotterdam. Due to the data, in 2000 there were no welfare
spells yet exceeding one year. In 2001, there were 312 eligible spells, of which 118 actually
had a bonus payment. This is about 38%. It should be stressed that this is the take-up rate
for the first bonus-payment. Some bonuses were paid in made in multiple tranches upon still
having work.
4 Model
In this section we provide the empirical model for estimating the effects of benefit sanctions
and reemployment bonuses on the job finding rate of welfare recipients. For this purpose, we
use a continuous time duration model, which describes the transition from welfare to work.
In the identification of the model we exploit the fact that the exact timing of a sanction
is unanticipated by welfare recipients. No anticipation implies that before the actual moment
of getting a sanction imposed, the sanction does not have any effect on reemployment. Only
at the moment of imposing a sanction, the exit rates to work jumps. This is the so called
ex post sanction effect. No anticipation does not mean that sanctions are given randomly
(conditional on observed characteristics). Welfare recipients may know if and when they are
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exposed to high risks of getting a sanction.7 This approach has been used before by Abbring
et al. (2005), Lalive et al. (2005) and Van den Berg et al. (2004). The details of the
identification are discussed at length in Abbring and Van den Berg (2003).
We cannot use a similar approach for estimating the effects of reemployment bonuses.
Welfare recipients are informed if and when they are entitled to receiving a bonus upon
finding work. However, the rules change over time, and only part of the welfare recipients are
affected by the reemployment bonuses. This allows us to distinguish between the effect of the
reemployment bonus and calendar time effects. Like in difference-in-difference estimation the
identification of the effect of the reemployment bonuses thus hinges on the assumption of a
common trend for affected and non-affected welfare recipients.
Recall that the data describe individuals who started collecting welfare benefits between
January 1, 2000 and August 1, 2003. Consider an individual entering welfare at date τ0, who
has been unemployed for t days. The exit rate from welfare to work depends not only on
calendar time τ0 + t and the elapsed duration of welfare t, but also on observed individual
characteristics x and unobserved characteristics vu. Furthermore, the transition rate from
welfare to work can be affected by whether or not a sanction has been imposed on the welfare
recipient. Let ts denote the elapsed duration op imposing a sanction, and I(t > ts) is thus an
indicator if after t days of welfare the individual has been punished by a sanction. For this
welfare recipient the reemployment rate is described by the mixed proportional hazard rate
θu(t|x, τ0, ts, vu) = λu(t)ψu(τ0 + t) exp(xβu + δI(t > ts) + γ(t|τ0) + vu)
where λu(t) is true (piecewise constant) duration dependence and ψu(τ0 + t) are genuine
calendar time effects modeled by dummies for each quarter.
The parameter δ is the ex-post effect of imposing a sanction, this parameter describes how
the hazard rate shifts at the moment a sanction is imposed on the welfare recipients. The
other parameter of interest is γ(t|τ0), which is the effect of promising a reemployment bonus.
Recall from Subsection 3.1 that individuals are entitled to receiving a reemployment bonus if
they find work after more than one year of collecting welfare benefits (and do not return to
unemployment within half a year). However, the size of the bonuses has been changed over
the years. Changes were always implemented on January 1. Furthermore, on January 1, 2003
the bonus schemes were stopped. This implies that γ(t|τ0) is zero if τ0 + t exceeds January
1, 2003.
7To the extent that welfare recipients want to avoid a benefit sanction they may change their behavior
before such a sanction is imposed. This is the so called ex ante sanction effect.
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We allow reemployment bonuses to have two effects. First, there can be a true incentive
effect for those who are entitled to collecting the bonus when finding work. These are the
individuals collecting welfare for at least one year. Second, there can be an anticipation effect.
This effect arises if individuals close to one year of welfare reduce job search to avoid finding
work, or maybe delay accepting a job until becoming entitled to the reemployment bonus.
We, therefore, specify the effect of the reemployment bonus as
γ(t|τ0) =


0 if t ≤ 11 months or τ0 + t ≥ January 1, 2003
γ0,τ0+t if 11 months < t ≤ 12 months and τ0 + t < January 1, 2003
γ1,τ0+t if t > 12 months and τ0 + t < January 1, 2003
The parameter γ0,τ0+t measures the anticipation effect of the bonuses. This implies that
between 11 and 12 months of unemployment the model allows individuals to anticipate that
they might get a bonus when finding work after 12 months. In Subsection 5.2 we investigate
the importance of choosing 11 months as the start of the anticipation effect. The parameter
γ0,τ0+t is different for each (calendar) year. This is also the case for γ1,τ0+t which measures
the incentive effects of the bonuses after 12 months of unemployment. The reason is that the
size of the reemployment bonuses varied over the years.
The key identification problem is that we have to distinguish between both between true
duration dependence λu(t) and the bonus effects, and between calendar time effects ψu(τ0+ t)
and the bonus effects. First, we exploit that from January 1, 2003 welfare recipients were no
longer entitled to receiving reemployment bonuses. This implies that both γ0,τ and γ1,τ should
be zero if τ0 + t exceeds January 1, 2003. Changes is reemployment rates over the duration
of unemployment in 2003 are thus only the consequences of true duration dependence.
Second, to separate true calendar time effects from the effects of reemployment bonuses,
we assume that anticipation effects do not start immediately after entering welfare. Changes
over exit rates to work over calendar time shortly after entering welfare are thus only the
consequence of true calendar time effects, while such changes for longer durations are the
consequence of both calendar time effects and changes in bonus effects. The identifying
assumption is thus proportionality of duration dependence and calendar time effects in the
exit rate to work, which is equivalent to the common trend assumption in difference-in-
difference estimation.
An alternative identification strategy would be to focus on exact dates at which the rules
for the reemployment bonuses changed. By considering reemployment rate just below and just
after the policy change, we could identify the effect of the policy change (e.g. Van den Berg
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et al., 2010). Such an approach is equivalent to regression discontinuity and would require
smoothness in calendar-time effects around the moment of the policy change. Applying
this approach would not be very attractive in our case. First, because outflow rates from
welfare are low, and we thus observe too few exits from welfare in a small interval around
the thresholds (in particular when focussing on welfare recipients with spells exceeding one
year). Furthermore and maybe more important is that we lack information about the exact
moment at which welfare recipients were informed.8
Sanctions are not given randomly (and also not conditional on observed characteristics).
This suggests a correlation between the timing of a sanction ts and unobserved characteristics
vu. To take account of this endogeneity problem, we jointly model the timing of imposing a
sanction with exit to work. The rate at which sanctions are imposed on individuals is given
by
θs(t|x, τ0, vs) = λs(t)ψs(τ0 + t) exp(xβs + vs)
Again λs(t) is genuine duration dependence, and ψs(τ0 + t) are calendar-time effects. The
calendar-time effects are again modeled using dummy variables for each quarter. To account
for selectivity in imposing sanctions the unobserved components of the reemployment rate
and the sanction rate – vu and vs – are allowed to be correlated to each other.
We take the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms vu and vs to be
bivariate discrete with two unrestricted mass-point locations for each term. Let vau, v
b
u, v
a
s
and vbs denote the points of support of vu and vs, respectively. The associated probabilities
are denoted as follows:
Pr(vu = v
a
u, vs = v
a
s ) = p1 Pr(vu = v
b
u, vs = v
a
s ) = p3
Pr(vu = v
a
u, vs = v
b
s) = p2 Pr(vu = v
b
u, vs = v
b
s) = p4
with 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 for i = 1, . . . , 4, and p4 = 1− p1 − p2 − p3.
Finally, we parameterize the pattern of duration dependence. We take both λu(t) and
λs(t) to have a piecewise constant specification,
λi(t) = exp

 ∑
j=1,2,...
λijIj (t)

 i = u, s
where j is a subscript for time intervals and Ij(t) are time-varying dummy variables that are
one in consecutive time intervals. Note that with an increasing number of time intervals any
duration dependence pattern can be approximated arbitrarily closely.
8There is some evidence that in some years welfare recipients were informed about the change in the bonus
scheme after it was already implemented.
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To estimate the parameters in our model, we use maximum likelihood estimation. It
should be noted that our data contain some multiple spells of collecting welfare of the same
individuals. We exploit this by assuming that within different spells, the unobserved hetero-
geneity term of an individual remains the same. It is well known that information on multiple
spells improves the identification of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.
Specifying the loglikelihood function requires that we fist introduce some additional nota-
tion. Consider a data set including N individuals, and individual i = 1, . . . , N experiences Ji
spells of collecting welfare benefits. Of course, not during all spells a sanction imposed. The
variable dsij describes if a sanction was imposed during spell j of individual i. If no sanction
was imposed the duration until imposing a sanction ts,ij equals the observed duration of the
welfare spell tij. Finally, the indicator d
u
ij denotes if a welfare spell ended in finding work.
The loglikelihood function equals
L =
N∑
i=1
log


∑
vu,vs
Ji∏
j=1
θu(tij |xij , τ0,ij, ts,ij, vu)
du
ij exp
(
−
∫ tij
0
θu(t|xij , τ0,ij , ts,ij, vu)dt
)
θs(ts,ij|xij , τ0,ij, vs)
ds
ij exp
(∫ ts,ij
0
θs(t|xij , τ0,ij, vs)dt
)
Pr(vu, vs)
}
Note that this loglikelihood function indeed imposes that all spells of one individual share
the same unobserved heterogeneity term. We optimize this logelikelihood function over all
unknown parameters.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Parameter estimates
Table 2 provides the parameter estimates of the baseline model. We estimate the model
separately for men and women. For both men and women we find only two points of support
in the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity. This implies that conditional on observed
characteristics there is perfect negative correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity in
the exit rate to work and the sanction rate. In both case the two points describe that
individuals with a higher exit rate to work have a lower sanction rate. However, for men the
difference in sanction rate between welfare recipients with a high and low rate is very small.
For both men and women most probability mass is located to welfare recipients with a low
exit rate and high sanction rate, 72% and 59%, respectively for men and women.
The main parameters of interest are the effects of the reemployment bonuses and the
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Table 2: Estimation results of the baseline model
Males Females
Reemployment Sanction Reemployment Sanction
rate rate rate rate
Duration dependence
λ1−3 0 0 0 0
λ4−6 0.331 (0.036) −0.201 (0.070) 0.246 (0.044) −0.327 (0.103)
λ7−9 0.301 (0.043) −0.169 (0.078) 0.198 (0.052) −0.517 (0.118)
λ10−12 0.204 (0.054) −0.181 (0.090) 0.104 (0.065) −0.441 (0.125)
λ13−18 0.162 (0.074) −0.086 (0.087) −0.015 (0.089) −0.563 (0.118)
λ19−24 0.177 (0.084) 0.008 (0.106) −0.087 (0.098) −0.556 (0.136)
λ25−36 −0.135 (0.096) −0.124 (0.119) −0.327 (0.105) −0.573 (0.142)
λ37+ −0.203 (0.170) −0.321 (0.243) −0.420 (0.195) −0.447 (0.237)
Bonus effects
2000 pre 0 0
2000 post − −
2001 pre 0.118 (0.096) −0.111 (0.129)
2001 post −0.098 (0.076) 0.054 (0.094)
2002 pre 0.111 (0.101) −0.077 (0.138)
2002 post 0.018 (0.063) 0.090 (0.078)
2003 pre 0 0
2003 post 0 0
Sanction effect
Sanction 0.185 (0.077) 0.443 (0.136)
Covariate effects
ln(Age) 0.924 (0.084) 1.658 (0.164) 1.060 (0.101) 2.078 (0.236)
Children −0.325 (0.049) −0.322 (0.094) −0.614 (0.034) −0.458 (0.070)
Married 0.006 (0.050) −0.072 (0.096) 0.292 (0.072) 0.282 (0.143)
Non-Dutch −0.235 (0.036) −0.246 (0.064) −0.283 (0.055) −0.345 (0.120)
School-leaver 0.154 (0.043) −0.090 (0.094) 0.174 (0.047) 0.155 (0.102)
Lost work 0.144 (0.032) 0.484 (0.055) 0.238 (0.047) 0.517 (0.091)
UI expired −0.075 (0.037) 0.069 (0.067) 0.072 (0.055) 0.100 (0.118)
Joint household 0.278 (0.026) 0.205 (0.047) 0.665 (0.036) 0.009 (0.076)
Unobserved heterogeneity
v1 −10.180 (0.523) −15.907 (0.777) −11.188 (0.468) −17.874 (1.198)
v2 −10.957 (0.453) −15.799 (0.790) −12.156 (0.500) −16.663 (1.060)
p11 0.278 (0.307) 0.415 (0.167)
p22 0.722 (0.307) 0.585 (0.167)
Calendar time effects
2000.I 0 0 0 0
2000.II 0.167 (0.132) 0.852 (0.348) 0.411 (0.181) −0.625 (0.406)
2000.III 0.053 (0.129) 0.645 (0.346) 0.302 (0.177) −0.453 (0.368)
2000.IV −0.134 (0.128) 0.479 (0.344) 0.189 (0.175) −0.465 (0.355)
2001.I 0.005 (0.125) 0.959 (0.333) 0.324 (0.174) −0.183 (0.341)
2001.II 0.120 (0.124) 0.790 (0.334) 0.292 (0.174) −0.241 (0.340)
2001.III 0.061 (0.125) 0.803 (0.333) 0.353 (0.174) −0.139 (0.334)
2001.IV 0.004 (0.125) 0.536 (0.335) 0.315 (0.174) −0.386 (0.340)
2002.I −0.031 (0.124) 0.778 (0.332) 0.254 (0.174) 0.110 (0.329)
2002.II −0.155 (0.125) 0.818 (0.331) −0.028 (0.175) 0.150 (0.327)
2002.III 0.039 (0.124) 0.951 (0.332) 0.312 (0.172) 0.134 (0.327)
2002.IV −0.190 (0.125) 0.967 (0.329) 0.094 (0.173) 0.159 (0.325)
2003.I −0.229 (0.125) 0.987 (0.329) 0.065 (0.175) 0.184 (0.324)
2003.II −0.380 (0.126) 0.813 (0.330) −0.185 (0.177) 0.174 (0.325)
2003.III −0.857 (0.132) 1.234 (0.329) −0.397 (0.180) 0.513 (0.325)
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Table 3: Simulation experiments showing job finding rate within two years after entering
welfare on January 1, 2001
Males Females
No bonuses, and no sanction 62.5% 48.9%
Bonus, but no sanction 62.9% 49.9%
No bonus, but sanction after one year 65.4% 54.9%
Bonus and sanction after one year 65.9% 56.2%
benefit sanctions. First, sanctions do have a positive and significant effect on reemployment.
The effect is more than twice as large for women than for men. Second, the effect of the
bonuses is insignificant. For women the parameters have the expected sign, but the effects
are small (in particular when compared to the sanction effects). For men the estimated
coefficients do not even have the expected sign.
A sanction increased the exit rate to work of men by about 20%. For women this is about
56%. Our findings for women are well in the range of previous studies such as Abbring et
al. (2005) finding an increase from 35 to 100%, Lalive et al. (2005) finding an increase of
45% and Svarer (2007) finding an increase of 50%. Our findings for men are relatively small
compared to these previous studies. It should, however, be noted that sanctions are more
often applied on men than on women. A man who did not find work within six months after
entering welfare has a 6.0% probability of having a sanction imposed in this period, while
this is only 3.5% for women. Also, in recent years benefit sanctions were used more often
than in the 1990s which might reduce the effects and explain the smaller effect compared to
Van den Berg et al. (2004). Furthermore, men are more likely to leave welfare than women.
If no sanction would have been imposed, around 21.0% of the men and 17.3% of the women
leave welfare within six months. If after three months a sanction is imposed, the probability
that a man leaves welfare within six months increases from 21.0 to 23.0%. For women such
a sanction would increase the reemployment from 17.3 to 21.5%.
To get some insight in the effect of the reemployment bonus, we simulate the model
assuming that all individuals enter welfare on January 1, 2001 and focus on finding work
within two years. Table 3 shows the results for these simulations. If there would not be any
reemployment bonuses and there would not be any sanction applied during the first two years
of collecting welfare benefits, 48.9% of the women and 62.5% of the men would find work within
two years. The reemployment bonus scheme slightly increases this to 49.9% and 62.9% for
women and men, respectively. These effects are small, but in line with previous reemployment
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bonus studies that also find small effects. Imposing a sanction after one year of welfare causes
a much more substantial increase in the reemployment rate, i.e. the reemployment rates
increases to 54.9% and 65.4% for women and men respectively. Finally, the two financial
incentives combined increase for women reemployment from 48.9% to 56.2% and for men
from 62.5% to 65.9%.
There are a few reasons why bonuses might have not been very effective in stimulating
reemployment. First, recall from Section 3.3 that the take-up rate of the first bonus payment
is about 38%. This is not because welfare recipients are unaware about the reemployment
bonus scheme. Caseworkers are instructed to inform welfare recipients about the existence
of the scheme, and welfare recipients also receive written information. Furthermore, at the
moment of a change in the scheme, all welfare recipients received a letter. Of course, it might
be that the annual policy changes caused welfare recipients to not completely understand the
incentives. We return to this issue in Section 6.
Both for men and for women the exit rate to work is highest between four and six months
after entering welfare. After being on welfare for six months the exit rate to work decreases
monotonically. It should be noted that the decrease in exit rate to work is more rapidly for
women than for men. For both men and women the sanction rate is highest during the first
three months on collecting welfare benefits. After this period there is no clear pattern in the
duration dependence.
The covariate effects of the observed individual characteristics on the exit rate to work
are very similar for men and women. The exit rate to work is higher for older individuals,
individuals without children, non-singles, individuals with a Dutch nationality, and those who
entered welfare after leaving school and after their unemployment insurance benefits expired.
The calendar time effects show that at the end of 2002 reemployment rates started to
drop. It should be noted that our observation period is characterized by a reducing GDP
growth rate since the end of 1999. In the fourth quarter of 1999 the GDP growth rate was
almost 6% and this reduced to 0% in the first quarter in 2002.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we present a few sensitivity analyses to investigate the robustness of our
estimation results with respect to the model specification. We focus on the importance
of controlling for selection in imposing sanctions, the specification of business cycle effects,
anticipation effects for reemployment bonuses and the nature of the exit state. Table 4 shows
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the results of these sensitivity analyses for the effects of bonuses and sanctions.
In the first sensitivity analysis, we ignore that sanctions are imposed selectively. This
implies that there is no correlation in the unobserved heterogeneity terms in the reemployment
rate and the sanction rate. The reemployment rate can thus be estimated without jointly
estimating the sanction rate. It should be noted that it does not mean that unobserved
heterogeneity is absent. The upper part of Table 4 presents the estimated sanction and
bonus effects. The only substantial difference is that the size of the sanction effect for women
reduces to about half the value. Compared to the results for men, the baseline model for
women had much more dispersion in unobserved heterogeneity. This explains why we only
find a substantial effect for women.
The identification of the bonus effects relies on accounting correctly for calendar-time
effects. In the baseline model, we included dummy-variables for each quarter. We replace
these by business cycle indicators. In particular, we use nationwide GDP growth and as
local business cycle indicator the number of job vacancies over the number of non-employed
job seekers. Job vacancies registered at the local public employment office, are estimated to
be about 25% of all vacancies, but they are mainly the vacancies for low-skilled jobs, most
relevant for welfare recipients. The number of non-employed job-seekers are those registered at
the public employment office. Additionally, we include year dummies and seasonal dummies.
The second part of the Table 4 shows the estimated effects of sanctions and reemployment
bonuses are very similar as in the baseline model.
In the next sensitivity analysis we consider the length of the anticipation period prior
to becoming eligible for the reemployment bonus. In the baseline model, we imposed that
one month prior to becoming eligible, welfare recipients can change their behavior. In the
sensitivity analysis we extend this to two months. As can be seen in the second part of
Table 4, both for men and women, the estimated anticipations effects become much smaller
compared to the baseline model. This confirms that anticipation of welfare recipients is not
present more than one month before becoming eligible for the reemployment bonus.
In the final sensitivity analysis, we consider the reason for leaving welfare. In the earlier
analyses we simply modeled any exit from collecting welfare. In the sensitivity analysis, we
only focus on finding paid work and all other exit channels are considered as exogenously
right-censored. It should, however, be stressed that registering the correct reason for exit
is difficult for the welfare agency. In the data, there are many unknown destinations and
individuals moving abroad or to other municipalities. These might to a large extent be
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Table 4: Sensitivity analyses.
Males Females
No selectivity
Sanction on exit 0.169 (0.039) 0.206 (0.067)
Bonus effects
2000 pre 0 0
2000 post − −
2001 pre 0.118 (0.096) −0.113 (0.129)
2001 post −0.097 (0.076) 0.047 (0.094)
2002 pre 0.111 (0.101) −0.077 (0.138)
2002 post 0.018 (0.063) 0.084 (0.078)
2003 pre 0 0
2003 post 0 0
Polynomial in calendar time
Sanction on exit 0.172 (0.070) 0.432 (0.136)
Bonus effects
2000 pre 0 0
2000 post − −
2001 pre 0.114 (0.095) −0.109 (0.129)
2001 post −0.049 (0.075) 0.103 (0.093)
2002 pre 0.107 (0.100) −0.075 (0.138)
2002 post 0.026 (0.062) 0.097 (0.078)
2003 pre 0 0
2003 post 0 0
Anticipation during two months
Sanction on exit 0.186 (0.078) 0.443 (0.136)
Bonus effects
2000 pre 0 0
2000 post − −
2001 pre 0.071 (0.080) 0.014 (0.101)
2001 post −0.097 (0.076) 0.063 (0.094)
2002 pre 0.087 (0.083) −0.015 (0.109)
2002 post 0.022 (0.063) 0.093 (0.079)
2003 pre 0 0
2003 post 0 0
Only registered exit to work
Sanction on exit 0.164 (0.140) −0.007 (0.170)
Bonus effects
2000 pre 0 0
2000 post − −
2001 pre 0.268 (0.149) 0.061 (0.101)
2001 post −0.199 (0.131) −0.050 (0.094)
2002 pre −0.030 (0.178) −0.051 (0.283)
2002 post 0.050 (0.107) 0.176 (0.137)
2003 pre 0 0
2003 post 0 0
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welfare recipients finding work but without informing the welfare agency about the reason for
the outflow from the benefit system. For example, it is very difficult for a welfare recipient
to move and start collecting welfare benefits in another municipality. It is more likely that a
welfare recipient moved to another municipality because (s)he found work there. The bottom
part of Table 4 shows the estimates of the policy parameters when exit is restricted to those
reporting finding paid work. For males the results are quite in line with the earlier results,
although standard errors increase substantially. The latter also happens for women, but here
also parameter estimates change. In particular, the sanction effect becomes zero. This might
imply that after a sanction women leave welfare for other reasons than finding work. We
should, however, keep in mind that it is very difficult for the welfare agency to register the
main reason for leaving welfare.
All in all, our parameter estimates are quite robust to these alternative specifications.
6 What explains our findings?
Our main findings are that reemployment bonuses don’t seem to have worked, while benefit
sanctions increased the job finding rate significantly. The latter finding is in line with previous
empirical studies and is also in line with a search theoretical framework in which benefit
sanctions increase the costs of remaining unemployed thus stimulating welfare recipients to
find a job. However, reemployment bonuses should also increase job finding because the value
of accepting a job increases. What explains the differences in our findings concerning the
effects of benefit sanctions and reemployment bonuses? It could be that welfare recipients are
“impatient”, i.e. they assign a lower value to future benefits of job search and therefore exert
less effort to find a job. In addition to this, welfare recipients may have so called hyperbolic
time preferences, i.e. the are “present biased” in the sense that in the short run they discount
highly while in the long run they discount less.
Della Vigna and Paserman (2005) investigate the relevance of impatience and hyperbolic
discounting in job search decisions.9 They argue that workers who are more impatient search
less intensively and set lower reservation wages. With normal time preferences the effect of
9There are only a few studies empirically investigating the existence of hyperbolic discounting in labor
market decisions. A rare example is Fang and Silverman (2009) who investigate the relationship between time
discounting and welfare program participation decisions using NLSY data. They find evidence of a present-
bias and conclude that limiting the duration of welfare benefits may substantially increase employment. Under
certain conditions also workfare may be useful, not only to increase employment but also increase life time
utility of welfare recipients.
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impatience on job finding rates is unclear as the decrease in search intensity lowers the job
finding rate while the lower reservation wages increase the job finding rate. With hyperbolic
time preferences the search effect dominates and increases in impatience lead to lower job
finding rates. Analyzing NLSY and PSID data, Della Vigna and Paserman (2005) conclude
that the effect of impatience on search effort is negative and sizable; the effect of impatience
on reservation wages and reemployment wages is essentially zero.
With this in mind we can explain our findings. The lack of effects from the reemployment
bonuses may be related to a low take-up rate, but the low take-up rate cannot be attributed
to lack of information among welfare recipients. The caseworkers made the welfare recipients
aware of the existence and nature of the reemployment bonuses, the welfare recipients also
received a letter at their home addresses about their eligibility for a reemployment bonus.
Nevertheless, the ineffectiveness of the reemployment bonuses is not very surprising. Whereas
in the US reemployment bonuses were provided at the start of unemployment spells, in Rot-
terdam only long-term unemployed welfare recipients were eligible for a reemployment bonus.
The delay in payments might well limit the incentives from a reemployment bonus.10 In 2001
for example the maximum bonus of 1800 Euros (1.6 * monthly minimum wage) is substantial,
but paid in 4 equal amounts of 450 Euro, each 6 months after the start of the job. So the last
payment would occur 2 years after the start on the job. The balance between short run costs
in job search and long run benefits of the reemployment bonus may not be positive inducing
welfare recipients not to increase their search intensity.
The effectiveness of benefit sanctions can be explained in a traditional job search model.
Nevertheless, hyperbolic discounting has interesting welfare implications. Paserman (2008)
argues that with hyperbolic discounting benefit sanctions might even be welfare improving
for individual unemployed workers.11 He concludes that because some workers are present-
biased an optimal unemployment benefit policy takes the form of monitoring search effort, and
imposing sanctions on workers who do not meet the effort threshold. The policy has a positive
effect on the hyperbolic worker’s long-run utility. Time-inconsistent workers may benefit
10Restricting reemployment bonuses to long-term unemployed also implies that only workers with a bad labor
market position qualified. Through a process of dynamic selection the most suitable workers have probably
left the welfare system before becoming eligible for reemployment bonuses.
11Paserman compares different types of labor market policies: cutting the level of unemployment benefits,
shortening the duration of benefits, changing the time profile of unemployment benefits, job search assis-
tance, monitoring search intensity, monitoring job acceptance, re-employment bonus. The different policies
are evaluated from the perspective of an individual who is not currently unemployed when deciding whether
to implement a change to the unemployment insurance system.
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particularly from policies that commit them to a higher search intensity. The implication
for labor market policy is that direct assistance that forces the worker to overcome their
procrastination problem and to go through the most unpleasant steps of the search process
is likely to be beneficial. The government’s threat to cut benefits if the welfare recipient does
not exert sufficient search effort acts exactly as this desirable commitment device.
7 Conclusions
It is not always easy to bring unemployed back to work. Expensive active labor market pro-
grams are often not very effective. Low cost programs focusing on monitoring of unemployed
workers and providing financial incentives seem to do a better job. We study the transition
from welfare to work in the municipality of Rotterdam where benefit recipients were exposed
to various financial incentives. Their benefits could be reduced temporarily as punishment
for noncompliance with eligibility requirements. However, they could also be rewarded for
“good” behavior. Once their unemployment spell lasted more than one year, they were enti-
tled to a reemployment bonus if they found a job. In this paper we investigate how benefit
sanctions and reemployment bonuses affected job finding rates of welfare recipients. In line
with previous studies we find substantial effects of benefit sanctions and no effects of reem-
ployment bonuses. Previous US based studies find positive effects of reemployment bonuses
but these effects are often rather small. When comparing the incentive structure in the US
bonus experiment with the reemployment bonus in Rotterdam it is not surprising that we find
very small effects. Whereas in the US reemployment bonuses are paid at the start of the un-
employment spell to unemployed with low short-lasting benefits, in Rotterdam reemployment
bonuses were offered to unemployed workers with relatively high long-lasting benefits, earliest
after one year of unemployment when the job finding rate were small anyway. In addition
to this, the reemployment bonus policy in Rotterdam changed frequently such that every
year a new system was in place. For researchers such variation is very helpful in identifying
treatment effects, for welfare recipients these changes may have been confusing.
Apart from institutional reasons why reemployment bonuses were not as effective as benefit
sanctions, our findings that a stick works while a carrot doesn’t may be related to present-bias
of some workers. To the extent that some welfare recipients are present-biased an incentive
scheme that requires immediate search effort in exchange for delayed rewards in terms of a
future bonus may not be an effective scheme. Benefit sanctions breaking the present bias by
imposing immediate costs to lack of search effort might indeed be an effective and welfare
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improving scheme.
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